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Does Relative Position Matter in Poor Societies?  
Evidence from a Survey Experiment in Rural Ethiopia 
Alpaslan Akay, Peter Martinsson, and Haileselassie Medhin 
Abstract 
We investigated attitudes toward positionality among rural farmers in northern Ethiopia, using a 
tailored two-part survey experiment. On average, we found positional concerns neither in income per se, 
nor in income from aid projects among the farmers. These results support the claim that positional 
concerns are correlated with absolute level of income of a country.  
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Does Relative Position Matter in Poor Societies?  
Evidence from a Survey Experiment in Rural Ethiopia 
Alpaslan Akay, Peter Martinsson, and Haileselassie Medhin∗ 
Introduction 
Positional (or status) concern has been a frequently-discussed and well-documented 
phenomenon in developed countries (e.g., Solnick and Hemenway 1998; Johansson-Stenman, 
Carlsson, and Daruvala 2002; Clark, Frijters, and Shields 2008). Torsten Veblen (1899/1994, 
chap. 4) introduced this issue as a broad phenomenon across society by discussing conspicuous 
consumption while in modern popular media this is often referred to as “keeping up with the 
Joneses.” A result of positional concerns is that the utility derived from a good depends not only 
on the absolute amount of the good consumed, but also on the relative amount of the good 
consumed compared to the consumption of other individuals.  
Positional concerns have been empirically investigated using data on self-reported 
happiness (or “subjective well-being” or “life satisfaction”) from surveys, as well as tailored 
survey experiments. To investigate positional concerns in the happiness framework, the average 
income of others (denoted as relative income in these analyses) is used as an indicator to measure 
positional concerns. The impact of relative income on happiness is studied, while controlling for 
the subject’s own absolute income. The general conclusion from this research shows that 
happiness is significantly and negatively affected by relative income. For example, an increase in 
relative income decreases one’s own level of happiness or an increase in own income results in 
increased happiness because the subject has relatively higher income (e.g., Clark and Oswald 
1996; McBride 2001; Ferrer-i-Carbonell 2005; Luttmer 2005; and especially Clark, Frijters, and 
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Shields 2008).1 Tailored survey experiments—constructed to explicitly identify the degree to 
which individuals care for absolute and relative income or consumption—have also shown that 
people have positional concerns both for income as well as consumption of specific goods, such 
as cars and holidays (see e.g., Alpízar et al. 2005; Carlsson, Johansson-Stenman, and Martinsson 
2007a; Johansson-Stenman, Carlsson, and Daruvala 2002; Solnick and Hemenway 1998, 2007).  
In a recent paper, Clark, Frijters, and Shields (2008) discussed the impact of relative 
income on happiness within and across countries. They argued that relative income concerns 
increase as one moves from poorer to richer countries. But still, positional concerns may also 
influence people in very poor countries. In the same vein, Frey and Stutzer (2002) argued that, 
when absolute income is above some subsistence level, other factors, such as relative income, 
start to influence well-being. However, most of the research on positional concerns is based on 
data from Western countries that are rich in absolute terms, and research on survey experiments 
is predominantly based on preferences stated by well-off (comparatively) university students in 
Western countries. Some exceptions exist, such as the stated preference study by Carlsson et al. 
(2007b) in Vietnam, where they found very low positional concerns among poor rural 
Vietnamese farmers.2 Solnick and Hemenway (2007) found that U.S. and Chinese individuals 
had different degrees of positional concerns on different goods. While Chinese consider income, 
personal education, and vacation time as positional, individuals from the United States 
considered attractiveness and intelligence as positional.   
The objective of this paper is to test whether positional concerns matter among extremely 
poor people using a two-part survey experiment. Our study was conducted in northern Ethiopia,3 
which is one of the poorest regions in the world, using a similar set up to Alpízar et al. (2005), 
for example. We surveyed farmers in the village of Abraha We Atsbaha. The experiment focused 
on positional concerns in two dimensions:   1) yearly income from all sources, and 2) income 
                                                 
1 There is a discussion regarding to whom individuals compare themselves, i.e., who belongs to their reference 
group. It is an important issue because it determines the calculation of the average income in the reference group, 
which is later used when analyzing the effect of relative income on happiness. (See e.g., Clark and Senik 2008; and 
Senik 2009). 
2 Using a different approach, Banerjee and Duflo (2007) investigated spending patterns in poor households in 
Udaipur, India. Their findings indicated that poor households spend a substantial proportion of their total 
consumption on festivals, tobacco, and alcohol. In another study, van Kempen (2003) found that poor people in 
Bolivia show positional concern by preferring goods with designer or brand labels. 
3 In 2002, Ethiopia’s purchasing power parity per capita was 2.05% of that of the United States. Ethiopia ranked the 
seventh poorest country in the world and one of the top recipients of foreign aid (World Bank 2004). Environment for Development  Akay, Martinsson, and Medhin 
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from an aid package. In the first experiment, we tested for positional concerns for overall income 
and, more specifically, for the claim by Clark, Frijters, and Shields (2008) that the positional 
concerns should be lower in a very poor country—which to our knowledge is an untested 
empirical question. The second experiment tests whether there are positional concerns for 
income from an aid package. This is a potential important issue for the well-being of those 
people who are not selected to receive the aid package and, thus, for the overall welfare effect of 
the aid project.  
Aid-based development projects often select a smaller fraction of households in a village 
to be “model farmers” for a new farm technology or improved input, while in other cases aid 
projects may target certain household in a community, according to some criteria, such as 
income and family size. If people do have positional concerns, then how the aid project is 
implemented may have significant implications to overall welfare.  
The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 gives the design of the 
survey experiment and the method behind it. Section 2 presents the results of the experiments, 
and the last section concludes the paper.    
1.  Experiment Design  
The two most common ways to model relative position in a utility framework are 1) a 
ratio comparison utility function,  ) , ( x x x v U = , where x is the individual’s income and  x  is 
the average income in the society (e.g., Boskin and Sheshinski 1978; Layard 1980; Persson 
1995); or 2) an additive comparison utility function,  ) , ( x x x v U − = . (See, e.g. Akerlof 1997; 
Knell 1999; Ljungqvist and Uhlig 2000). In this paper, we chose to apply the following additive 
comparison utility function:  
) ( ) 1 ( x x x v − + − = γ γ , 
where γ measures the marginal degree of positional concern, i.e., it measures the proportion of 
the total change in utility that comes from an increase in relative income after a marginal 
increase of own income.  
In order to test the effect of positional concern in both the dimensions of income per se 
and income from aid package, we applied a survey experiment. We created a scenario describing 
the situation where individuals are about to make decision. In the experiment on income, subjects 
were told that they could choose between living in two villages, and that the annual income 
(from all sources) earned by them and other people differed in each village. The income was Environment for Development  Akay, Martinsson, and Medhin 
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described as the annual income in Ethiopian birr (ETB).4 The respondents were asked to make 
six choices between paired alternatives that they as individuals would prefer to have 
implemented. Because most of our subjects had no formal education and many were illiterate, 
the instructions were given verbally in the local language (Tigrinya), and the same procedure 
was applied for the socioeconomic questions.  
The income across the choice sets was constructed to measure the degree of positional 
concern. For example, in the first choice situation, an individual’s yearly income in alternative A 
was ETB 2,990 and the average yearly income for others in the village was ETB 3,900; while, in 
alternative B, the individual’s yearly income was ETB 2,860 and the average yearly income in 
the village was also lower at ETB 2,600. (See appendix 1 for the full description of the scenario 
read to the subjects.)  
If a respondent was indifferent between living in these two villages, then we have, in the 
case of the additive comparison utility function, that: 
B B A A x x x x γ γ − = − .  















γ .  
Thus, the marginal degree of positional concern γ  is equal to 0.1 in this case. If the 
respondent chose to live in village A, then  1 . 0 < γ , or (otherwise) at least equal to 0.1. The 
subjects were asked to make repeated choices between two villages to live in, which gave us 
information about their degree of positional concerns, at least within an upper and lower bound. 
The construction of our survey was such that alternative A remained the same throughout the 
experiments, while the levels varied for alternative B. The levels used in the experiments, 
together with the implicit marginal degree of positional concern, are summarized in table 1.5  
                                                 
4 The official exchange rate was US$ 1 =  ETB 9.67 at the time of the survey.  
5 The levels applied in the survey experiment were partly affected by the results from two smaller pilot tests. The 
implicit marginal degree of positional concern with the ratio comparison utility function took the values of 0.110, 
0.224, 0.345, 0.471, 0.605, and 0.746 ( // AA BB x xx x
γγ = ), and marginal degree of positional concern was calculated 
with  ln( / )/ln( / ) AB AB x xx x
γγ γ = . Environment for Development  Akay, Martinsson, and Medhin 
5 
We determined the implicit marginal degree of positional concerns for a specific 
individual as follows. When an individual preferred alternative A over alternative Bi (i = 1, 2, 3, 
4, 5, 6), then we knew that the marginal degree of positional concern was below the level 
calculated at that specific choice situation. In the survey, the respondents were asked to make 
choices until alternative A was chosen, meaning that each respondent was presented with a 
maximum of six choices for income.  
The income experiment from aid project was constructed in the same way, where subjects 
were told that they could choose between living in two villages, where their income from 
implemented bee-keeping packages, as well as the other people’s, would differ in each village. 
The income from bee keeping in a village was described as the annual income for them and the 
mean annual income for the others in the village. This was then followed by six paired choices to 
trace the marginal degree of positionality. (The full description of scenario read to the subjects is 
in appendix 2.)  
Table 1. Alternatives in Positionality Survey 
 Individual’s  annual 
income 
Average annual income 
in village  Implicit marginal 
degree of 








Alternative A  3900  900  2990  690   
Alternative B1 2600 600 2860 660  0.1 
Alternative B2 2600 600 2730 630  0.2 
Alternative B3 2600 600 2600 600  0.3 
Alternative B4 2600 600 2470 570  0.4 
Alternative B5 2600 600 2340 540  0.5 
Alternative B6 2600 600 2210 510  0.6 
ETB = Ethiopian birr 
2. Results 
Table 2 shows the frequency distribution of the marginal degree of positional concerns 
for the two survey experiments among 94 farmers.6 Most of the subjects were not concerned with 
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their positionality and chose alternative A in the first choice situation (60.6 and 65.7 percent 
income per se and income from aid packages, respectively). The estimated median degree of 
positionality was 0 for both experiments, and the mean degree of positionality was 0.158 for 
income per se and 0.177 for the income obtained from the aid projects. These results obtained 
from raw data support the hypothesis that the concern for relative position in poor societies is a 
very small component of individuals’ total utility from an increase in their income.7  
Table 2. Results of the Experiments 
Marginal degree of 
positionality 
Total income  Income from aid projects 
No.  Freq.  Cum. Freq.  No.  Freq.  Cum. Freq. 
γ  < 0.1  62 65.66  65.66  57  60.64  60.64 
0.1 < γ  < 0.2  6 6.38 72.34  4  4.26  64.89 
0.2 < γ  < 0.3  3 3.19 75.53  4  4.26  69.15 
0.3 < γ  < 0.4  16 17.02  92.55  17  18.09  87.23 
0.4 < γ  < 0.5  2 2.13 94.68  9  9.57  96.81 
0. 5 < γ  < 0.6  2 2.13 96.81  2  1.06  97.87 
γ ≥0.6  3 3.19 100.0  1  2.13  100.0 
We also analyzed the degree of positional concerns in the two experiments using 
regression analyses. Table 3 reports interval regressions for the two experiments, where the 
marginal degree of positionality is explained by socioeconomic characteristics of the subjects.8 
Income and land size had no significant influence on preferences for positional concerns. The 
only significant demographic variables were marital status and gender. Female subjects were 
significantly less positional than male subjects in both experiments. Married subjects were more 
concerned with their position with income from aid packages. Members of religious groups 
seemed partially more concerned about their relative position for total yearly income. On the 
                                                 
7 The results given in tables 2 and 3 are robust to specification of the utility function, which is mainly due to the fact 
that most individuals switched their first-choice situation.  
8 In the interval regression, we set the lower and upper bounds, as shown in table 1. In case of extreme choices, i.e., 
where A is chosen in first choice set or is never chosen, we made the lower bound 0 in the former case and the upper 
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other hand, frequent church goers did not seem to have positional concerns.9 The degree of 
church attendance can be a proxy for the degree of belief. Thus, it is not surprising that subjects 
with deep faith tended to follow the common teaching of the church. 
Table 3. Interval Regression Estimates of the Degree of Positionality 
  Total income  Income from aid projects 
  Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value  Mean 
Age /100  0.437  0.539  0.923  0.229  0.430 
Age-squared /10,000  -0.595  0.416 -0.896  0.236  0.206 
Marital-status (married = 1)  0.053  0.113  0.066  0.086  0.787 
Gender (female = 1)  -0.080  0.049 -0.087  0.022  0.510 
Health-status (healthy = 1)  -0.002  0.964  0.034  0.322  0.712 
Number of adults in home  -0.007 0.659 0.006  0.701  2.691 
Education (at least one year = 1)  -0.053  0.144  0.007  0.870  0.521 
Log (land size)  -0.025  0.493  -0.010  0.819  0.546 
Log (per capita income)  -0.033  0.196  -0.022  0.454  4.462 
Membership-farmer association 
(member = 1) 
-0.026 0.570 
-0.041 0.336  0.287 
Membership-religious group 
(member = 1) 
0.065  0.093 
0.035  0.232  0.617 





0.494 -0.021  0.045  3.241 
Constant  0.287  0.225  0.071  0.786   
Ln(Sigma) -1.883  0.000  -1.879  0.000   
Number of observations  91    91     
Notes: Health status is obtained from a question with this range of answers: 1 = very good; 2 = good; 3 = neither good 
nor poor; 4 = poor; and 5 = -very poor. The variable used here is a dummy: health status = 1, if subject answer is 1, 2 or 
3.  
Per capita income is calculated by dividing the income by household size.  
Education is a dummy variable and it is equal to unity if the subject is educated at least on year.  
Land size is measures in hectares. 
The regression results presented above can also be used to estimate the mean degree of 
positional concerns conditional on socioeconomic characteristics of the subjects. To show this, 
we first predicted the marginal degree of positionality using the estimated parameters for each 
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individual, and then calculated the mean degree of positional concern.  Using the bootstrap 
technique, the mean level of predicted marginal degree of positional concerns was 0.268 for the 
income per se, with a 95 percent confidence interval of (0.123, 0.412) using 1000 replications. 
The mean level of predicted marginal degree of positional concerns for income from the aid 
package was 0.188, which is larger than for income from the aid package, and 95 percent 
confidence interval is (0.06, 0.314). The hypothesis that mean marginal degree of positional 
concerns equals zero can be rejected for both goods (p-value = 0.000 and p-value = 0.004, 
respectively).  
Our results indicate a very low degree of positional concerns in comparison with other 
studies, which used similar tools to estimate the mean degree of positional concerns in richer 
countries in the world. For instance, Carlsson, Johansson-Stenman, and Martinsson (2007a) 
estimated a mean degree of positional concern for income in the range of 0.59 and 0.71, using a 
random sample of Swedish population, while Alpízar, Carlsson, and Johansson-Stenman (2005) 
estimated the degree to be 0.45, using a sample of Costa Rican university students. The study 
that we consider closest to our study and our findings is Carlsson et al. (2007b), which used poor 
Vietnamese farmers and found a median degree of positionality of 0.25 (mean degree of 
positionality is 0.28). Overall, our results are consistent with the idea discussed by Clark, 
Frijters, and Shields (2008) that individuals in poorer countries are less positionally concerned.  
3. Discussions and Conclusion  
This paper investigates the hypotheses concerning whether extremely poor individuals in 
a rural part of Ethiopia have positional concerns in the dimensions of income per se and income 
from an aid package. We used a survey-experiment approach, in which the individuals chose 
between two villages to live in, where they and the other people had different average incomes in 
each village, to calculate the marginal degree of positional concerns. We found the estimated 
mean degree of positional concerns to be very low in absolute terms. Our results showed much 
lower concern for positionality compared to similar studies conducted in developed countries. 
Moreover, our results are in line with the discussion in Clark, Frijters, and Shields (2008) that 
people in poorer countries have lower positional concerns.  
 There are several explanations for why the low degree of positional concern occurred. 
Our subject pool is extremely poor and during some part of the year they need foreign aid for 
daily food. This supports Frey and Stutzer’s (2002) argument that people are concerned with 
positionality above a certain threshold. The role of kinship relations is higher in rural 
communities in Ethiopia, compared to urban areas in Western countries. As a result, individuals Environment for Development  Akay, Martinsson, and Medhin 
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attach a higher value to the overall welfare of their community. There are other informal 
networks (such as a labor-sharing network like DEBO) and insurance mechanisms (such as 
rotating savings and credit associations for funeral costs), where farmers help each other. This 
may explain why individuals have low positional concerns. Our results imply that the income of 
others in a village and from aid projects only marginally affect the utility of other individuals 
who live in the same village or participate in the same aid projects. The evidence from our 
survey experiments shows that development agencies and non-governmental organizations do 
not have to take into account the potential negative effect on overall welfare from positional 
concerns when implementing aid packages. Of course, more research is needed on this very 
important issue. Environment for Development  Akay, Martinsson, and Medhin 
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 Appendixes 
1.  Instructions for the Income Experiment  
Imagine that you can choose to live in one of two villages. Your yearly income and 
average yearly income will differ between the two villages.  
I will tell you the amount of income that you will have and the average income for the 
others in each village. I will then ask you to choose which village you would like to live in. Let 
me illustrate this choice with the following example.  
Village A: 
Your yearly income is ETB 2,530.  
The yearly average village income is ETB 3,300.  
Village B: 
Your yearly income is ETB 2,310.  
The yearly average village income is ETB 2,200. 
 
In this example, your yearly income is ETB 220 more in Village A than in Village B. In 
Village A, you earn ETB 770 less than average income in the village, while in Village B, you get 
ETB 110 more. Given this difference, you can either choose to live in Village A or B. (Repeat 
question and example.) 
Now, I’ll ask you to make your choice between two different villages.  
(Using the table below, ask the first question in the following way.) In Village A, your 
yearly income is ETB 2,990, while the average yearly income in the village is ETB 3,900. In 
Village B1, your yearly income is ETB 2,860, while the average yearly income in the village is 
ETB 2,600. In which village, A or B1, do you want to live?      
(If the respondent chooses A, stop. If respondent chooses B1, ask her/him to choose 
between A and B2. Do not change the format of the question, except for the numbers. Follow the 
same procedure for the other choices.) 
 Environment for Development  Akay, Martinsson, and Medhin 
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Alternatives  Your yearly income 
(ETB) 
Yearly average income 
in the village (ETB) 
A  2990  3900 
B1  2860  2600 
A 2990  3900 
B2 2730  2600 
A  2990  3900 
B3  2600  2600 
A 2990  3900 
B4 2470  2600 
A  2990  3900 
B5  2340  2600 
A 2990  3900 
B6 2210  2600 
 
2.  Instructions for the Aid Package Experiment 
Assume that you are introduced to two different bee-keeping aid packages, which will 
make you earn money. These packages are distributed free by the government. You can choose 
one of the packages you want for your village and there will be no cost to you or to the village.   
Your income and the income of other people in your village changes with the package 
that you prefer from the two alternatives. The income from the package affects your life, which 
means you might feel as if you are richer than the others in the village. 
I will tell you the amount of income for you and for others in the village in each 
alternative, and then I will ask you to choose one of the two. Let me illustrate this choice by the 
following example.  
Alternative A: 
Your yearly income from the package is ETB 575.  
The yearly average village income from the package is ETB 750.  
Alternative B: 
Your yearly income from the package is ETB 550.  
The yearly average village income from the package is ETB 500.  Environment for Development  Akay, Martinsson, and Medhin 
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In this example, you get ETB 25 more in Alternative A than in Alternative B. In 
alternative A, you get ETB 175 less than average income in the village, while in Alternative B 
you get ETB 50 more. Given this difference, you can either choose A or B for your village. 
(Repeat question and example.) 
Now, I’ll ask you to make your choice between different alternatives.  
 
(Using the table below, ask the first question in the following way.) In package A, your 
yearly income is ETB 690, while the average yearly income in your village is ETB 900. In 
package B1, your yearly income is ETB 660, while the average yearly income in your village is 
ETB 600. Which alternative package, A or B1, do you want for you village?      
(If the respondent chooses A, stop. If respondent chooses B1, ask her/him to choose 
between A and B2. Do not change the format of the question except for the numbers. Follow the 
same procedure for the other choices.) 
 
Alternatives 
Your yearly income 
from the aid package 
(ETB) 
Yearly average income 
for your village from the 
aid package (ETB) 
A  690  900 
B1  660  600 
A 690  900 
B2 630  600 
A  690  900 
B3  600  600 
A 690  900 
B4 570  600 
A  690  900 
B5  540  600 
A 690  900 
B6 510  600 
 
 
 